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CHAPTER 13'S LIBERAL DISCHARGE PROVISIONS AND
"WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS" TORT JUDGMENTS:
CREDITOR CLASSIFICATION AS A MEANS OF
ACCOUNTING FOR THE DEBTOR'S EGREGIOUS ACTION
"One of the primary purposes of the bankruptcy act is to
'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive indebt-
edness and permit him to start afresh . . . . "' To accomplish
its "fresh start" objective, the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,2
commonly known as the "Bankruptcy Code," provides for a va-
riety of debtors, including both individuals and businesses. The
principal provisions applicable to individual debtors are chapters
73 and 13.4 These provisions differ in a number of ways, including
the types of debts each permits the debtor to discharge. In
general, chapter 13's discharge provisions are significantly more
liberal than those of chapter 7.5
Chapter 13's liberal discharge provisions have sparked a whirl-
wind of controversy." The controversy revolves around a debtor's
ability to discharge certain categories of debt in a chapter 13
proceeding that Congress specifically designated nondischarge-
able under chapter 7.7 Emerging at the controversy's forefront
1. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quoting Williams v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915)).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988).
3. Id. SS 701-766.
4. I& SS 1301-1330.
5. See infra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Pioneer Bank v. Rasmussen (In re Rasmussen), 888 F.2d 703 (10th Cir. 1989)
(per curiam) (whether a chapter 13 petitioner may discharge a debt incurred through
fraud, a nondischargeable debt under chapter 7 by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)); Burns v. United
States (rn re Burns), 887 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989) (whether a chapter 13 petitioner may
discharge interest on unpaid federal income taxes, a nondischargeable debt under chapter
7 by 11 U.S.C. 5 523(a)(7)); Student Loan Comm'n v. Doersam (In re Doersam), 849 F.2d
237 (6th Cir. 1988) (whether a chapter 13 petitioner may discharge student loans, a
nondischargeable debt under chapter 7 by 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX8)); In re Belt, 106 Bankr.
553 (Bankr. NMD. Ind. 1989) (mem.) (whether a chapter 13 petitioner may discharge a debt
incurred through driving while intoxicated, a nondischargeable debt under chapter 7 by
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9)); Lanker v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 101 Bankr. 39 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1989) (whether a chapter 13 petitioner may discharge a debt incurred while violating a
fiduciary duty, a nondischargeable debt under chapter 7 by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4)).
7. In 11 U.S.C.A. § 523 (West 1979 & West Supp. 1991), Congress delineates exceptions
to discharge:
(a) A discharge under section 727 . . .of this title does not discharge an
individual debtor from any debt-
(1) for a tax or a customs duty-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinancing
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is a debtor's ability under chapter 13 to discharge a court-ordered
tort judgment for "willful and malicious" infliction of injury onto
the person or property of another.
In In re LeMaire,8 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit confronted one of the most egregious examples of
a willful and malicious tortfeasor's attempt to discharge a court-
ordered tort judgment. LeMaire involved a debtor who shot his
victim several times with the admitted intent to kill.9 Affirming
both the bankruptcy and district courts, a three-member panel
of the Eighth Circuit concluded that the manner in which the
debtor incurred his debt did not preclude a chapter 13 discharge.10
of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other than
a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
or
(B) use of a statement in writing-
(i) that is materially false;
(ii) respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial condition;
(iii) on which the creditor to whom the debtor is liable for such
money, property, services, or credit reasonably relied; and
(iv) that the debtor caused to be made or published with intent
to deceive; or
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement,
or larceny;
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree. . . or property settlement agreement
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity;
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and
for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss . . . ;
(8) for an educational loan made, insured, or guaranteed by a governmental
unit, or made under any program funded in whole or in part by a govern-
mental unit or a nonprofit institution ...
(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of a motor
vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor was intoxicated
from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance;
8. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd en bane,
898 F.2d 1346 (1990).
9. Id. at 1375.
10. Id. at 1374. The court limited its holding, however, stating that "our refusal to
make the debt automatically nondischargeable does not mean that the circumstances
underlying a debt are irrelevant." Id. at 1375.
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Accordingly, the panel held that the debtor had filed his chapter
13 petition in good faith, thereby permitting him to discharge
over half the civil judgment against him." A full panel of the
Eighth Circuit, however, reversed the panel's decision en banc.
The controversy highlighted by LeMaire stems from chapter
13's illusive "good faith" requirement.12 Unlike chapter 7 liqui-
dation bankruptcy, chapter 13 permits the debtor to retain all of
his assets. 18 To take advantage of chapter 13, the debtor must
devise a repayment plan 4 that satisfies a good faith threshold
standard.'5 Whether courts should consider the manner in which
the debtor incurred his debt in determining the debtor's good
faith in proposing his repayment plan is a source of contention.
In general, courts have split on this question. 16 The Eighth
Circuit's en banc opinion, however, concluded that the circum-
stances giving rise to the debtor's debt can preclude a chapter
13 discharge. 7 Consequently, grounding its opinion in general
policy considerations and appeals to concepts of moral relativism,
the court held conclusively that a debtor could not propose in
good faith to discharge a court-ordered tort judgment resulting
from attempted murder. 8
By failing to provide detailed analysis rooted solidly in the
bankruptcy provisions themselves, the court lost a prime oppor-
tunity to develop an articulable standard for addressing a debtor's
egregious action. One avenue the court failed to explore is the
creditor classification provision of section 1322(b)(1) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, which permits the debtor to classify creditors ac-
11. Id. at 1379-80.
12. "The reported decisions demonstrate that 'good faith' is an illusive statutory
description of the limits of Chapter 13 relief." Nelson v. Easley (Un 'e Easley), 72 Bankr.
948, 950 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn.. 1987) (mem.).
13. 11 U.S.C. S 1306(b) (1988) ("Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order
confirming a plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.").
14. Id. SS 1321-22.
15. Id. S 1325(aX3); see also In re Lawson, 93 Bankr. 979, 986 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988)
(mem.) (quoting In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410, 426 (7th Cir. 1984)) (" '[It is
generally recognized that "good faith" is a threshold prerequisite to securing ... relief,
and that the lack of such good faith constitutes "cause" sufficient for dismissal.' ").
16. See In re Kazzaz, 62 Bankr. 308, 314-15 (Bankr. ED. Va. 1986) (mem.) ("totality of
circumstances" approach placed no emphasis on underlying circumstances of debt despite
being nondischargeable under chapter 7). Contra In re Smith, 848 F-2d 813, 821 (7th Cir.
1988) ("totality of circumstances" required bankruptcy court to consider "circumstances
in which Smith's debts arose and the fact they are otherwise nondischargeable").
17. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1352-53 (8th Cir. 1990) (en
banc).
18. I. at 1353.
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cording to the similarity of their claims.19 Pursuant to these
classifications, the debtor can propose to pay differing percent-
ages of debt owed to each class provided he avoids unfair dis-
crimination against any given class.20 By requiring the debtor,
under certain circumstances, to classify the victims of his willful
and malicious wrongdoing into a separate class and to pay those
victims a higher percentage of the debt owed to them in order
to meet the good faith standard, courts can provide a solid basis
to account for a debtor's egregious action.
This Note examines how courts have dealt with the good faith
requirement in the area of willful and malicious tort judgments.
It compares the competing policy considerations relating to the
Bankruptcy Code's underlying fresh start doctrine with those of
chapter 13's good faith requirement. The Note seeks to add a
new dimension to the judicial consideration of good faith by
incorporating creditor classification into the good faith analysis.
Finally, the Note contends that such a classification will result
in a sliding scale, taking into account the relative severity of the
debtor's willful and malicious conduct and the potential preclusion
of the debtor's use of chapter 13 to discharge debts incurred
under particularly egregious circumstances.
THE "FRESH START" DOCTRINE
The underlying premise of the Bankruptcy Code is to provide
the insolvent debtor with a fresh start.21 The fresh start doctrine,
however, did not originate with the concept of bankruptcy. Rather,
bankruptcy found its origins in the harsh and often barbaric
treatment of the delinquent debtor. Roman law, for example,
permitted a creditor to confine his delinquent debtor in sixty-
pound chains for sixty days at the creditor's house without food.2
Following this sixty-day confinement period, the creditor was
19. 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b)(1). Arguably, this approach would have been effective to account
for the debtor's willful and malicious conduct.
20. Id.
21. "[W]hether the debtor uses Chapter 7, Liquidation, or Chapter 13, Adjustment of
Debts of an Individual, bankruptcy relief should be effective, and should provide the
debtor with a fresh start." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 118 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6078-79. See generally Kennedy, Reflections
on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States: The Debtor's Fresh Start, 76 W. VA. L. REv.
427, 445-51 (1974) (emphasizing the impact of the fresh start policy upon the Bankruptcy
Code).
22. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 428-29.
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free either to put his debtor to death or to sell him into bondage.P
Although the imprisonment of debtors and other bodily sanc-
tions declined during the Middle Ages in order to preserve the
availability of the lords' subjects for military and other services,2
arrest and imprisonment of debtors emerged again in early Eng-
lish bankruptcy law, "and by the time of Blackstone all common
courts were allowing arrest and body execution routinely in civil
actions for collection of debts." During debate at the Constitu-
tional Convention of 1787, representative Roger Sherman noted
that bankruptcies were sometimes punishable by death under
the laws of England.26 Against this background, the United States
formulated its bankruptcy law.
Early American bankruptcy law, however, rejected the harsh
treatment of debtors, adopting a remedial rather than a punitive
approach.P From its inception in 1800,2 the American Bankruptcy
Code recognized bankruptcy's intricate relationship to the com-
mercial nature of the American economy.P As Congressman James
A. Bayard noted in debate during the Seventh Congress, "'[Bank-
ruptcy] is founded on the principle that commerce is built on
great credits; and great credits produce great debts. Owing to
the risks arising from these and other circumstances, the most
diligent and honorable merchant may be ruined without commit-
ting any fault.' " Consequently, the fresh start concept emerged
from growing commercialization and the realization that debtors
can find themselves under an insurmountable mound of debt
through no fault of their own.
- In a forceful speech, Daniel Webster captured eloquently the
essence of the fresh start doctrine's purpose.3' Referring to in-
solvent debtors, Webster stated, "Their power of earning is, in
truth, taken away; their faculty of useful employment is para-
lyzed, and hope itself become extinguished. 3 2 In Local Loan Co.
v. Hunt,33 the Supreme Court expounded upon the fresh start
23. Id.
24. Id. at 430; see Freedman, Imprisonment for Debt, 2 TEMp. L.Q. 330 (1928).
25. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 430.
26. Olmstead, Bankruptcy a Comme'rcial Regulation, 15 HARV. L. REv. 829, 831 (1902).
27. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 434.
28. Olmstead, supra note 26, at 833.
29. See id. passim.
30. Id. at 836 (quoting remarks of Rep. Bayard, Feb. 18, 1803).
31. See D. Webster, The Fault Is Not in the Constitution (May 18, 1840), reprinted in
THE GOLDEN AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 373 (C. Haar ed. 1965).
32. Id. at 378.
33. 292 U.S. 234 (1934).
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doctrine. The Court reasoned that the Bankruptcy Code's purpose
was to give "the honest but unfortunate debtor who surrenders
for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bank-
ruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort, unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt." Against this historical backdrop, Congress firmly
rooted the fresh start doctrine in the modern Bankruptcy Code.
American bankruptcy law thus puts the debtor back onto his
feet, rather than shackling the debtor in chains.
Providing a Fresh Start for Individuals
The Bankruptcy Code accomplishes its fresh start policy ob-
jective by providing an insolvent individual with a choice between
two alternatives: chapter 7 liquidation and chapter 13 adjustment
of the debts of an individual. The choice depends upon the
requirements of each alternative.
A chapter 7 liquidation is self-explanatory. In general, a debtor
who files under chapter 7 must surrender his assets to the trustee
in bankruptcy.3 5 The trustee then sells the assets, distributing
the cash proceeds to creditors who have filed claims against the
estate. 6 In most cases, the Bankruptcy Code then discharges the
debtor from any remaining debt, permitting an immediate fresh
start.37 Congress, however, expressly exempted nine classifica-
tions of debt from discharge in chapter 7,8 including debts
incurred through fraud,3 embezzlement, 40 and willful and mali-
cious conduct. 41
Recognizing the desirability of a debtor repaying a greater
portion of the debt than would result from a liquidation proceed-
34. Id. at 244.
35. 11 U.S.C. S 704(1) (1988). 11 U.S.C. S 522 allows a debtor to exempt from property
of the estate certain assets, including a fixed value of the debtor's homestead, automobile,
household furnishings, and tools of the debtor's trade or business. See id S 522(d).
36. Id. S 704(1). Whether appointed by the federal government or elected by the
creditors, the trustee in bankruptcy is "the representative of the estate." Id. S 323(a).
The trustee's powers vary under different chapters, but the chapter 7 trustee must
collect the "property of the estate" of the debtor, reduce the property to money, and
"close such estate as expeditiously as is compatible with the best interests of parties in
interest." Id. S 704(1).
37. The chapter 7 discharge provision is located at 11 U.S.C. S 727.
38. See supra note 7.
39. 11 U.S.C. S 523(aX(2).
40. Id. S 523(a)(4).
41. Id. S 523(a)(6).
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ing, Congress enacted chapter 13 as an alternative to chapter 7.4
Often considered a provision for wage earners, chapter 13 is
available only to those individuals with "regular income." Ac-
cording to the legislative history, however, a chapter 13 petition-
er's income need not come from wages. Rather, income from
practically any source may qualify, including social security pen-
sions or welfare benefits. 45 In addition, to qualify for chapter 13
relief, an individual must have noncontingent, liquidated, unse-
cured debts totaling less than $100,000 and noncontingent, liqui-
dated, secured debts totaling less than $350,000.46 If the debtor
meets these income and debt ceiling requirements, he is eligible
to file a chapter 13 petition with the court.
A Fresh Start Under Chapter 18
To take advantage of chapter 13, the Bankruptcy Code requires
the debtor to submit a repayment plan for court approval.47
Among other requirements, the repayment plan must propose to
pay creditors as much of their claims as they would receive under
a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding.4 In addition, the plan must
propose to expend all of the debtor's disposable income over the
duration of the plan if an unsecured creditor objects to confir-
mation of the plan. 49 The plan may last up to three years,50
although the court, for cause, may approve a plan that lasts as
long as five years.51
42. Id SS 1301-1330.
43. "'[Individual with regular income' means individual whose income is sufficiently
stable and regular to enable such individual to make payments under a plan under chapter
13 of this title, other than a stockbroker or a commodity broker." Id. S 101(29).
44. The legislative history makes clear "welfare, social security, fixed pension incomes,
or... investment incomes" are sufficient to qualify an individual for chapter 13. S. REP.
No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 24, reprinted in 1978 US. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787,
5810.
45. I&
46. 11 U.S.C. S 109(e).
47. Id- SS 1321-1322.
48. I& S 1325(a4). This section does not apply, however, to creditors who hold
nondischargeable claims under chapter 7 and S 523(a). If a creditor holding a nondis-
chargeable claim under chapter 7 could object to a chapter 13 repayment plan on the
basis that he would receive more through a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding, the same
debts would be exempt from discharge in chapter 13 as in chapter 7. Congress clearly
did not intend such a result, providing for only two chapter 13 nondischargeable debts
in S 1328(a). See, e.g., In re Jenkins, 4 Bankr. 278, 281 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1980) (mem.) ("Were
it otherwise... we would engraft upon 11 U.S.C. 1328 (the chapter 13 discharge provision)
an exception not passed by Congress.").
49. 11 U.S.C. S 1325(b)(1).
50. Id. S 1322(c).
51. Id.
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Within his plan, the chapter 13 petitioner may designate classes
of unsecured claims.52 He may not, however, discriminate unfairly
against any designated classes.as The legislative history explains
that the provision permits "inclusion of claims or interests in a
particular class only if the claim or interest being included is
substantially similar to the other claims or interests of the
class."54
Following the debtor's submission of his repayment plan, the
court must hold a confirmation hearing.55 At the hearing, the
Bankruptcy Code requires the court to confirm the debtor's plan
if it meets specified criteria.? These criteria include a finding by
52. I& § 1322(b)(1).
53. Id-
54. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 406 (1977), reprinted in 1978 US. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6362. This section of the legislative history pertains to S
1122 of the Bankruptcy Code, which S 1322(b}l) incorporates by reference: "[T]he plan
may-(1) designate a class or classes of unsecured claims, as provided in section 1122 of
this title, but may not discriminate unfairly against any class so designated." 11 U.S.C.
S 1322(b)(1). Collier explains the meaning of the phrase "substantially similar": "[S]uch
phrase must be construed to mean similar in legal character or affect .... Thus....
the nature of the claim or interest is relevant to classification, not the nature or identity
of the holder of the claim or interest." 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1122.03, at 1122-27
(15th ed. 1990); see, e.g., In re Wade, 4 Bankr. 98, 99 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1980) (classification
of unsecured claims based upon a distinction between debts cosigned by family members
and those not so cosigned held invalid as discriminatory against the latter class of
unsecured creditors).
55. 11 U.S.C. S 1324.
56. Id. § 1325. The section provides:
(a) The court shall confirm a plan if-
(1) The plan complies with the provisions of this chapter and with the
other applicable provisions of this title;
(2) any fee, charge, or amount required under chapter 123 of title 28,
or by the plan, to be paid before confirmation, has been paid;
(3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means
forbidden by law;
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim
is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on
such date;
(5) with respect to each allowed secured claim provided for by the
plan-
(A) the holder of such claim has accepted the plan;
(B) (i) the plan provides that the holder of such claim retain
the lien securing such claim; and
(ii) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
to be distributed under the plan on account of such claim
is not less than the allowed amount of such claim; or
(C) the debtor surrenders the property securing such claim to
1072
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the court that the debtor submitted his plan in good faith.57
If the court approves the repayment plan and the debtor
completes all payments under the plan, the court shall grant a
discharge of all debts provided for by the plan or disallowed
under section 502.e Although the debtor must commit all of his
disposable income 9 to the repayment plan for three to five years,
Congress provided two major incentives to encourage debtors to
use chapter 13 rather than chapter 7. First, chapter 13 allows
debtors to retain their assets upon a decree of bankruptcyee
Second, and more importantly, chapter 13 contains extremely
liberal discharge provisions.61 Unlike chapter 7, which exempts
ten classifications of debt from discharge,62 chapter 13 exempts
only two:e (1) long-term obligations running beyond the term of
the holder; and
(6) the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and
to comply with the plan.
Id. "Several courts have held that S 1325(a) makes confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan
mandatory where all six conditions of that provision are satisfied." Foster v. Heitkamp
(In re Foster), 670 F.2d 478, 486 (5th Cir. 1982).
57. 11 U.S.C. S 1325(aX3).
58. Id S 1328(a). In certain instances, the court may also grant a discharge to a debtor
who has not completed payments under a plan after notice and a hearing. Id. S 1328(b).
59. Id. S 1325(b1)(B). The Bankruptcy Code defines disposable income as:
income which is received by the debtor and which is not reasonably necessary
to be expended-
(A) for the maintenance or support of the debtor or a dependent of the
debtor; and
(B) if the debtor is engaged in business, for the payment of expenditures
necessary for the continuation, preservation, and operation of such business.
Id. S 1325(bX2). Some courts have viewed Congress' enactment of the disposable income
requirement as a narrowing of the inquiry into good faith. See, e.g., Education Assistance
Corp. v. Zellner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1987). The weight of authority, however,
holds that the disposable income requirement does not displace any inquiry into a debtor's
good faith. See, e.g., In re Girdaukas, 92 Bankr. 373, 377 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988) ('[Glood
faith is ... a discrete and paramount test that is separate and distinct from the best
effort requirement.").
60. 11 U.S.C. S 1306(b) ("Except as provided in a confirmed plan or order confirming a
plan, the debtor shall remain in possession of all property of the estate.").
61. Id S 1328.
62. Id. S 523(aX1M(10).
63. Id S 1328(a). The section provides:
(a) As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan, unless the court approves a written waiver of discharge
executed by the debtor after the order for relief under this chapter, the
court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the
plan or disallowed under section 502 of this title, except any debt-
(1) provided for under section 1322(bX5) of this title; or
(2) of the kind specified in section 523(aX5) of this title.
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the plan" and (2) debts owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child
for support payments.65
WILLFUL AND MALICIOUS VS. GOOD FAITH
The requirement that the chapter 13 petitioner submit his
repayment plan in good faith poses a difficult dilemma to courts:
whether a petitioner may propose in good faith the discharge of
a civil tort judgment for willful and malicious infliction of injury.
Chapter 7 exempts willful and malicious tort judgments from
discharge.6 6 Chapter 13, however, makes no similar exemption.6 7
The Bankruptcy Code provides no clear guidance as to the
meaning of "good faith." Neither the Bankruptcy Code nor its
legislative history defines the term.68 As a result, the good faith
requirement has sparked a proliferation of litigation,69 prompting
one commentator to brand the good faith requirement the most
litigated aspect of chapter 137o
Courts have held uniformly that tort judgments nondischarge-
able under chapter 7 are subject to discharge under chapter 13.71
64. Id. §S 1328(a)(1), 1322(b)(5).
65. Id. S 1328(a)(2), 523(a5).
66. Id. S 523(a)(6). In a chapter 7 proceeding, the Bankruptcy Code exempts from
discharge debts incurred for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity
or to the property of another entity." Id.
67. See, e.g., Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1348 (8th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (rejecting the challenging creditor's argument that, as a matter of law, the
debtor could not discharge debts arising from criminal acts and considering the totality
of the circumstances to determine whether debtor proposed the plan in good faith);
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 429 (6th Cir. 1982) ("except for
alimony and child support the nine exceptions to discharge, including fraud, applicable
to Chapter 7 are not applicable to Chapter 13").
68. Memphis Bank & Trust, 692 F.2d at 431 ("the 'good faith' requirement is neither
defined in the Bankruptcy Code nor discussed in the legislative history").
69. One court summarized the struggle to define good faith as follows:
The Bankruptcy Code does not define "good faith." There is no illuminating
legislative history. More than 300 reported "good faith" decisions form a
maze of rules and exceptions swallowing rules. Nearly identical fact patterns
have produced inconsistent results within judicial districts and across the
circuits. The reported decisions demonstrate that "good faith" is an illusive
statutory description of the limits of Chapter 13 relief.
Nelson v. Easley (In re Easley), 72 Bankr. 948, 950 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1987) (mem.).
70. Cyr, The Chapter 13 "Good Faith" Tempest: An Analysis and Proposal for Change,
55 Am. BANKR. L.J. 271, 273 (1981); see also In re Sanders, 28 Bankr. 917, 919 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1983) (mem.) ("applications of 'good faith' have been as varied as the phrase is
ambiguous").
71. See In re Chase, 43 Bankr. 739, 743 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984) (mem.) (citing In re Scher,
12 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981)) ("It is clear that debts resulting from illegal acts
such as embezzlement, fraud, and willful and malicious injury can be discharged under
1074
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Generally, courts have contended that the statute is ambiguous,
forcing an inquiry into congressional intent.7 2 Specifically, with
respect to willful and malicious infliction of injury, the majority
of courts have held that the manner in which the individual
incurred his debt cannot be the exclusive factor used to decide
whether the repayment plan satisfies the good faith require-
ment.7 3
Courts have applied varying standards, however, to determine
whether the requisite good faith exists. The overwhelming ma-
jority of courts have adopted a case-by-case, totality of the
circumstances approach.74 Generally, these courts have developed
a list of factors to consider, such as the debtor's motivation and
sincerity in seeking chapter 13 relief and special circumstances
confronting the individual debtor.75 In contrast, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit simplified
its interpretation in Barnes v. W7wlan,76 defining "good faith"
merely as an "honesty of intention. '77
A point of much greater contention among the courts is whether
to consider the nature of the debts in determining the petitioner's
Chapter 13."); see also Lincoln v. Cherry Creek Homeowners Ass'n (Tn re Lincoln), 30
Bankr. 905, 910 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) ("the spirit and purpose of chapter 13 of the new
Code is to afford greater latitude and assistance to debtors than was present under the
old Act"); In re DeSimone, 25 Bankr. 728 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (mem.) (debt allegedly
the result of an assault dischargeable under § 1328(a)).
72. As one court stated, "Our task is to construe the statute, not to construct it."
Deans v. O'Donnell (In re Deans), 692 F.2d 968, 971 (4th Cir. 1982).
73. [A] debtor may in good faith restructure a debt which was incurred by
prepetition bad faith conduct. The nature of the debt itself cannot preclude
the confirmation of a Chapter 13 [plan] under a theory of bad faith unless
the debt was fraudulently incurred without any intention of repayment
because of an anticipated abuse of the Chapter 13 process.
In re Manes, 67 Bankr. 13, 15 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1986) (mem.) (quoting Margraf v. Oliver
(In re Oliver), 28 Bankr. 420, 424 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983)); see also Education Assistance
Corp. v. Zelner, 827 F.2d 1222, 1227 (8th Cir. 1987) (holding that the underlying circum-
stances of the debt should be one factor in considering the debtor's good faith but,
inferentially, not a determining factor).
74. See Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1378 n.9 (8th Cir. 1989)
("The D.C. Circuit was the only court of appeals to depart from the general trend toward
analyzing a list of facts as relevant to the totality of the circumstances."), rev'd en bane,
898 F.2d 1346 (1990).
75. See, e.g., Deans, 692 F.2d at 972:
[T]hese factors might include . . . the debtor's financial situation, the period
of time payment will be made, the debtor's employment history and pros-
pects, the nature and amount of unsecured claims, the debtor's past bank-
ruptcy filings, the debtor's honesty in representing facts, and any unusual
or exceptional problems facing the particular debtor.
76. 689 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
77. Id. at 200.
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good faith in seeking a chapter 13 discharge. The Bankruptcy
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia concluded in In re
Seely 8 that the underlying circumstances giving rise to the debt
are irrelevant in determining good faith.7 9 Even debts incurred
through willful and malicious action, nondischargeable under
chapter 7, cannot implicate good faith concerns: "[It is not bad
faith to utilize the liberal discharge provisions of Chapter 13."'8o
Other courts have concluded, however, that the nondischarge-
able nature of a debt under chapter 7 is one factor to consider
in evaluating a chapter 13 petitioner's good faith.81 According to
these courts, the characterization of the debt can bear upon the
debtor's motivation and sincerity in seeking chapter 13 relief.8
2
When a debtor has little disposable income, the use of chapter
13 thus may be nothing more than a disguised attempt to liqui-
date a debt that is otherwise nondischargeable in a chapter 7
liquidation proceeding.8 For example, in In re Smith,8 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the
confirmation of a debtor's repayment plan because the lower
court failed to account for the manner in which the debt arose.85
The appellate court held that "[u]nder a 'totality of the circum-
stances' test, a debt's nondischargeability under Chapter 7 arising
from a debtor's pre-filing conduct is relevant to the debtor's good
faith."86
78. Johnson v. Seely (in re Seely), 6 Bankr. 309 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980).
79. Id. at 313 ("good faith does not touch upon dischargeability").
80. Id.; see also In re Adamu, 82 Bankr. 128, 130 (Bankr. D. Or. 1988) (mem.) ("Congress
has provided in S 1325 the tests which, if met by the plan, require the court to confirm
the plan. That some of the debts would be nondischargeable in a Chapter 7 case is not
one of the stated tests.").
81. In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813 (7th Cir. 1988); Education Assistance Corp. v. Zellner,
827 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir. 1987).
82. Kitchens v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Kitchens), 702 F.2d 885, 889 (11th
Cir. 1983) (per curiam); Flygare v. Boulden, 709 F.2d 1344, 1347 (10th Cir. 1983); United
States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982).
83. See, e.g., Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346, 1350 (8th Cir. 1990)
(en banc) (Whether a debt is nondischargeable in chapter 7 "is closely linked to the
debtor's motivation and sincerity.").
84. 848 F.2d 813.
85. Id. at 816.
86. Id. at 818; see also Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149, 152-53 (4th Cir. 1986)
("[Although the discharge of an obligation which would be nondischargeable in Chapter
7 is not, standing alone, a sufficient basis on which to find bad faith or deny confirmation,
it is a relevant factor to be considered in the S 1325(a)(3) good faith inquiry."); Estus, 695
F.2d at 317 ("[S]ome of the factors that a court may find meaningful in making its
determination of good faith are ... (7) the type of debt sought to be discharged and
whether any such debt is nondischargeable in Chapter 7.").
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COMPETING POLICY CONSIDERATIONS: IN RE LEMAIRE
The Facts of LeMaire
In re LeMaire§ exemplifies the competing policy considerations
in discharging debts incurred through willful and malicious in-
fliction of injury by a debtor. Gregory LeMaire, the debtor,
intentionally shot Paul Handeen five times with the admitted
intent to kill.8 LeMaire pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and
served twenty-seven months in prison.8s9 Handeen sued LeMaire
and received a $50,362.50 judgment.90 Six years after release
from prison and one and one-half years after Handeen commenced
garnishment proceedings against him, LeMaire filed a chapter 13
bankruptcy petition.91
At the time Handeen received his civil tort judgment, LeMaire
was a graduate student at the University of Minnesota.9 2 After
receiving his Ph.D. in 1985, LeMaire served as a research fellow
at the same university.9 3 Consequently, at the time he filed for
bankruptcy, LeMaire derived his sole income from a research
stipend.94 The chapter 13 plan he submitted did not distinguish
classes of unsecured creditors as section 1322(b)(1) permits but
does not require 5 Rather, his plan called for equal percentage
repayments to all unsecured creditors over the maximum five
years allowed by statute, amounting to 42.3 percent of all unse-
cured claims, including the tort judgment in favor of Handeen.9 6
The only other claims that LeMaire's chapter 13 plan covered
included a student loan and three claims by his parents, evidenced
by a promissory note LeMaire signed the day before he filed his
chapter 13 petition.97
87. Handeen v. LeMaire {In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd en bano,
898 F.2d 1346 (1990).






94. Id. at 1376.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(1) (1988).
96. LeMaire, 883 F.2d at 1376.
97. I& at 1375 n.4. These claims included $3,600 for LeMaire's legal fees, $3,000 spent
in partial payment on Handeen's judgment, and $2,172 lent to him to buy a computer.
Id.
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Eighth Circuit Panel Decision
In a three-member panel decision, the Eighth Circuit asserted
that it must review the bankruptcy court's factual finding of
good faith under a "clearly erroneous standard.198 Basing its
conclusion upon the "express statutory language" of section
1328(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, the panel held that "debts which
fall within the scope of § 523(a)(6) may be discharged pursuant
to § 1328(a) if the debtor can meet the requisites of Chapter
13."100 The panel cautioned courts to "take great care in ascer-
taining a debtor's good faith where the debts he seeks to dis-
charge were incurred as a result of criminal activity."'' 1 The
panel nevertheless found that the totality of the circumstances
failed to reveal any clear error in the lower court's holding that
LeMaire filed his chapter 13 plan in good faith. 0 2 In this way,
the panel affirmed the general approach to interpreting the good
faith requirement.
The panel in LeMaire recognized the conflicting policy consid-
erations involved. These considerations posit the fresh start
doctrine against the advisability of permitting a willful and ma-
licious wrongdoer to discharge civil tort judgments imposed
against him. With respect to LeMaire's victim, the court quoted
the trial court with approval: "'[Handeen] has been grievously
wronged, seriously injured, and now may receive only part of
the agreed on compensation for that injury.' 103 The court con-
cluded, however, that the primary purpose for bankruptcy-to
provide the debtor a fresh start-overrode the justifications for
full payment to the aggrieved party.10 4
Eighth Circuit Rehearing En Banc
Rehearing the case en banc, the full Eighth Circuit reversed
the panel decision. 05 The court concluded that the bankruptcy
court's finding of good faith "was clearly erroneous because the
98. Id. at 1379.
99. Id. at 1377.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1380.
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting Handeen v. LeMaire, No. 4-87-164, slip op. at 13 (Bankr. Minn. Nov.
12, 1987)).
104. Id.
105. 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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evidence before the court regarding LeMaire's good faith was so
'implausible on its face that a reasonable factfinder would not
credit it.' "106 Specifically, the court faulted the bankruptcy court
and the panel for not according sufficient weight to the policy
ramifications inherent in permitting a debtor to discharge a debt
under chapter 13 arising from an attempted murder.1' Holding
the proposal to discharge the civil judgment devoid of good faith,
the court concluded "that there is a particularly strong policy
prohibiting the discharge of a debt resulting from a willful and
malicious injury following an attempted murder."'0 8
Analysis of the Eighth Circuit Decisions
LeMaire represents a relatively extreme example of the poten-
tial for an unconscionable result from chapter 13's liberal dis-
charge provisions.1' 9 In holding such a debt dischargeable, the
Eighth Circuit panel ignored its own warning that courts must
carefully scrutinize attempts to discharge debts incurred through
criminal actions. If a judicial analysis of the totality of the
circumstances allows an individual to discharge a tort judgment
for attempted murder, an examination of the circumstances giving
rise to the debt must represent only the most nominal of consid-
erations. The majority of other conceivable circumstances cul-
minating in a court-awarded judgment would be less
reprehensible" 0 and, therefore, less likely to affect a court's good
faith determination. Although acknowledging the need to examine
the underlying circumstances that give rise to a petitioner's debt,
the panel appeared more in accord with the approach holding
underlying circumstances irrelevant in the good faith determi-
nation."'
106. Id. at 1351 (quoting Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985)).
107. Id. at 1352 ("While the bankruptcy court correctly recognized that the exceptions
to discharge specified in section 523(a)(6) do not expressly apply to a Chapter 13 petition,
the court's analysis falls short by failing to examine the public policies promoted by not
discharging the debts enumerated there.").
108. Id. at 1353.
109. Courts have categorized a wide variety of court-imposed judgments as resulting
from willful and malicious conduct. See, e.g., Impulsora Del Territorio Sur, S.A. v. Cecchini
(In re Cecchini), 780 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1986) (wrongful conversion of property); Koch v.
Segler, 331 S.W.2d 126 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960) (malicious prosecution); infra text accompanying
notes 151-59.
110. For example, willful infliction of property damage, punching someone in the face
with no other intention than to inflict a bloody nose, or slandering someone's character
all reflect less debtorttortfeasor culpability than does attempted murder.
111. See, e.g., In re Kazzaz, 62 Bankr. 308, 313-15 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986) (mem.) (the
circumstances giving rise to a debt were irrelevant when the amount of alleged nondis-
chargeable debt is roughly equal to other unsecured debt).
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Consequently, the Eighth Circuit en bane properly reversed
the panel's decision. The court listed a number of factors that
indicated a lack of good faith, including the fact that LeMaire
filed his petition shortly after Handeen sought to collect on his
judgment, the listing of debts LeMaire owed his parents which
were evidenced by a promissory note signed only the day before
he filed his petition, and LeMaire's failure to list the United
States Public Health Service as a creditor when evidence indi-
cated that LeMaire worked as a research fellow to repay his
debt for a fellowship grant obtained from the United States
Public Health Service."2 The significance of the decision, how-
ever, lies in the court's conclusion that policy considerations can
render a debt nondischargeable under both chapter 7 and chapter
13.113
The Eighth Circuit recognized that among the debts nondis-
chargeable in chapter 7 but dischargeable in chapter 13, willful
and malicious tort judgments were unique. Specifically, the court
stated, "While there is a strong public policy prohibiting the
discharge of each of these types of debts [which are nondis-
chargeable in chapter 7], we believe that there is a particularly
strong policy prohibiting the discharge of a debt resulting from
a willful and malicious injury following an attempted murder.""4
The court expressly acknowledged that Congress sought to
encourage more debtors to file under chapter 13 by permitting
discharge of debts under chapter 13 that are otherwise nondis-
chargeable under chapter 7.115 The court reasoned nevertheless
that the "policies promoted by not discharging a debt resulting
from willful or malicious injury in any Chapter 7 case are also
implicated in this particular Chapter 13 case."" 6 The court then
stated cursorily that the bankruptcy court was "clearly erroneous
in not according these policies sufficient weight.""7 Finally, the
court held, without further analysis, that "the circumstances
surrounding this particular debt reveal that LeMaire did not
demonstrate the requisite good faith to seek Chapter 13 protec-
tion and that refusing to discharge this particular debt, because
of his lack of good faith, is consistent with the policies which the
Bankruptcy Code seeks to advance."" 8
112. LeMaire, 898 F.2d at 1351.
113. Id- at 1352-53.
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JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF CHAPTER 13
Despite a lack of detailed analysis, the Eighth Circuit's en bane
reversal of LeMaire's attempted discharge of the tort judgment
properly applied bankruptcy law. The legislative history suggests
that chapter 13 is a flexible provision for encouraging debtors to
repay debts," 9 and courts have emphasized this flexibility re-
peatedly.120 By making chapter 13's terms flexible, particularly
via the good faith requirement, Congress gave courts the ability
to avoid creating bad law with hard cases.
Accordingly, courts should avoid invariably proclaiming debts
that are nondischargeable in a chapter 7 proceeding to be auto-
matically dischargeable to the same extent as other unsecured
claims in a chapter 13 proceeding. Rather, courts must weigh the
debtor's interest in achieving a fresh start against society's
interest in preventing willful and malicious wrongdoers from
manipulating the Bankruptcy Code to avoid compensating their
victims. The en banc decision in LeMaire accorded sufficient
weight to these policy considerations, but the conclusiveness of
the opinion results in little precedential value and provides little
guidance for future courts confronting willful and malicious tort-
feasors' attempts to discharge civil judgments.
Congress specifically exempted only two types of debts from
discharge in chapter 13: family support and certain long-term
debts.12 Although other debts specifically exempted from dis-
charge under chapter 7 are "conspicuous by their absence,"''2
Congress failed to mandate expressly that courts permit dis-
charge of debts nondischargeable under chapter 7. Section 1328
merely provides that "after completion by the debtor of all
payments under the plan . . . the court shall grant the debtor a
discharge of all debts provided for by the plan."' A plain reading
of this section requires courts to permit discharge of debts
119. See S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 141, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5927 ("Chapter 13 is designed to serve as a flexible vehicle for the
repayment of part or all of the allowed claims of the debtor. Section 1322 emphasizes
that purpose by fixing a minimum of mandatory plan provisions.").
120. See, e.g., In re Lambert, 10 Bankr. 223, 225 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981) (mem.) (quoting
In re Yee, 7 Bankr. 747, 756 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[Trhe Code's good faith provisions
have been viewed as a flexible standard by which the court is to determine whether the
debtor's choice to proceed with a chapter 13 case is 'an abuse of the provisions, purpose
or spirit' of chapter 13.).
121. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a), 1322(bX5), 523(a)(5) (1988).
122. In re Chura, 33 Bankr. 558, 559 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (mem.).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
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provided for by the plan only if the court initially accepts the
plan.124 The section does not require the court to permit discharge
of debts contained within a plan that the court finds unacceptable.
Consequently, before the court even reaches the discharge pro-
visions of section 1328, the court must approve the debtor's plan
pursuant to the good faith provision of section 1325(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code.125
Imposing a prerequisite finding of good faith in chapter 13
cases entrusts the courts with discretion to review the unlimited
factual scenarios possible in a bankruptcy proceeding on a case-
by-case basis.itm Recognizing the multitude of factual scenarios
that may confront any given debtor, Congress did not define
"good faith" in the context of chapter 13, nor could it do so in a
manner applicable to all possible factual situations.' 27 Generally,
however, courts interpret the good faith provision to require, at
the very least, an investigation into whether the chapter 13
petitioner has violated the "provisions, purpose, or spirit of
Chapter 13."28
The Policy Behind Chapter 13
As forementioned, the overriding purpose of all bankruptcy
provisions is to provide the insolvent debtor with a fresh start.1 29
124. See, e.g., West Am. Ins. Co. v. Ramsey (In re Ramsey), No. 1-89-02260 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio Aug. 15, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Bankr file).
125. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
126. "A comprehensive definition of good faith is not practical. Broadly speaking, the
basic inquiry should be whether or not under the circumstances of the case there has
been an abuse of the provisions, purpose, or spirit of [the chapter] in the proposal."
Tenney v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634, 635 n.3 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (quoting
9 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 9.20, at 319 (14th ed. 1978); see also Ravenot v. Rimgale (In
re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 1982) (quoting Terry with approval).
127. See Metro Employees Credit Union v. Okoreeh-Baah (In re Okoreeh-Baah), 836
F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1988):
Good faith is an amorphous notion, largely defined by factual inquiry. In a
good faith analysis, the infinite variety of factors facing any particular debtor
must be weighed carefully. We cannot here promulgate any precise formulae
or measurements to be deployed in a mechanical good faith equation....
The decision should be left simply to the bankruptcy court's common sense
and judgment.
See also Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431 ("[Ihe conduct comprehended under the rubric 'good
faith' will have to be defined on a case-by-case basis as the courts encounter various
problems in the administration of Chapter 13's provisions.").
128. In re Smith, 848 F.2d 813, 818 (7th Cir. 1988); Neufeld v. Freeman, 794 F.2d 149,
152 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Estus (In re Estus), 695 F.2d 311, 316 (8th Cir. 1982);
Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 431.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 21-34.
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The fresh start principle has limits, however. For example, Con-
gress determined that the policy ramifications of allowing liqui-
dation of certain debts incurred through criminal action was
undesirable. Consequently, Congress exempted from chapter 7
discharge debts incurred through fraud,1 0 embezzlement, 131 and
willful and malicious conduct.1as The doctrine of fresh start cannot
simply wipe the slate of all debts.
Chapter 13, however, arose from different policy motivations.
By allowing discharge under chapter 13 of most debts nondis-
chargeable under chapter 7, Congress recognized that, in nar-
rowly defined circumstances,as3 the balancing of competing policy
considerations may result in the exemption of such debts from
discharge. Consequently, in enacting chapter 13, Congress looked
toward other policy considerations which, when combined with
the fresh start principle, merited the dischargeability of nearly
all types of debts." 4
Reasons Advanped for Liberal Chapter 13 Discharge
Congress sought to encourage insolvent debtors to avoid straight
liquidation by filing under chapter 13.15 Filing under chapter 13
allows the debtor to increase the percentage of claims paid to
creditors while preserving a fresh start for himself.las
Chapter 13 results in an increase in debt repayment for two
reasons: (1) the debtor must commit all of his disposable income
to his chapter 13 plan for a period lasting up to five years1' and
(2) chapter 13 is only available to the debtor if the repayment
130. See 11 U.S.C. S 523(4) (1988).
131. I&
132. Id. S 523(6).
133. See supra note 7.
134. See 11 U.S.C. S 1328(a). That section provides: "As soon as practicable after
completion by the debtor of all payments under the plan, . . . the court shall grant the
debtor a discharge of all debts provided for by the plan.., except any debt... (2) of
the kind specified in section 523(aX5) of this title."
135. See Note, A Separate Classification for Criminal Debt in Chapter 13, 62 IND. L.J.
383, 383-84 (authored by Marie Adamson) ("Congress' promotion of Chapter 13 as an
alternative to straight bankruptcy is commendable in principle for 'he with his Chapter
13 payments feeds three: himself, his hungering creditor, and some others.' ") (quoting
Johnson v. Seely (In re Seely), 6 Bankr. 309, 311 (Bankr. E.). Va. 1980)).
136. See id; see also Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. Cook (In re Cook), 26 Bankr. 187,
189 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (mem.) ("Although both [chapters 7 and 13] are aimed at providing
a 'fresh start' for the debtor, Chapter 13 is designed to promote creditor interests by
making future income available for the payment of debts and to promote debtor interests
by preserving the debtor's assets... .
137. 11 U.S.C. SS 1322(a)(1), 1322(c).
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plan will result in at least an equal percentage of debt repayment
as it would under chapter 7.18 As one means of encouraging
debtors to file under chapter 13, Congress enacted liberalized
discharge provisions.139 The liberal discharge provisions, however,
are not the only, and arguably should not be the primary, moti-
vation for filing under chapter 13.140 To the contrary, chapter 13
provides other significant advantages.
Chapter 13 provides debtors with the psychological satisfaction
of repaying at least a portion of their obligations.'4 ' Additionally,
chapter 13 allows the debtor to retain his assets, unlike straight
chapter 7 liquidation. 42 Finally, filing under chapter 13 rather
than chapter 7 better protects the debtor's credit rating. Credi-
tors view debtors who are willing to repay at least some of their
debts as a better risk than those who completely discharge their
debts through liquidation. 4 3 From a policy standpoint, therefore,
the Bankruptcy Code encourages debtors to file under chapter
138. Id. S 1325(a)(4).
139. As one commentator noted, "Congress found a worthwhile purpose in granting a
Chapter 13 discharge to all types of qualified debtors, 'including embezzlers, murderers,
rapists, forgers, thieves, arsonists and assorted other miscreants.'" Note, supra note 135,
at 388 (quoting In re Chase, 28 Bankr. 814, 819 n.3 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983) (mem.), rev'd on
other grounds, 43 Bankr. 739 (1984) (mem.)).
140. If the dischargeability of willful and malicious tort judgments was the sole
inducement for the debtor to file under chapter 13, his plan might violate the good faith
provision as courts have interpreted it. Courts generally have factored such motivation
into their consideration of good faith. See Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d
1346, 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc); In re Swan, 98 Bankr. 502, 504-05 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1989) (mem.).
141. See H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6079 (Chapter 13 "satisfies many debtors' desire to avoid the stigma
attached to straight bankruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on being able to meet
one's obligations."). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit advanced this reasoning in Ravenot v.
Rimgale (In re Rimgale), 669 F.2d 426, 427 (7th Cir. 1982), arguing that a chapter 13
rehabilitative plan enables the debtor to avoid the stigma of straight liquidation. See also
Note, supra note 135, at 384 ("The Chapter 13 debtor benefits from the discipline, legal
protection and mental satisfaction of fulfilling his obligations.").
142. 11 U.S.C. § 1306; see also H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in
1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6079 ("[D]eveloping a plan of repayment
under chapter 13, rather than opting for liquidation under chapter 7 . . . permits the
debtor to protect his assets. In a liquidation case, the debtor must surrender his
nonexempt assets for liquidation and sale by the trustee."); Note, supra note 135, at 383
("Unlike a Chapter 7 debtor, a Chapter 13 debtor does not lose possession of his property
to a trustee; he maintains control of his property throughout the Chapter 13 case without
any judicial interference.").
143. H.R. REP. No. 598, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5787, 6079 ("Chapter 13 . . . protects a debtor's credit standing far better
than a straight bankruptcy, because he is viewed by the credit industry as a better
risk.").
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13 and avoid chapter 7 liquidation, benefitting creditors while
restoring the debtor to a productive place in society.'4
The "Dangers" of Chapter 13
Chapter 13's liberal discharge provisions, however, present the
danger that debtors will use chapter 13 solely as a means of
effectively liquidating nondischargeable chapter 7 debts. In es-
sence, the debtor is completely in control of devising a repayment
plan. The good faith provision is the one effective check courts
have on a debtor's manipulation of the Bankruptcy Code in
violation of its purpose and spirit. Consequently, courts must
scrupulously question a debtor's motivation to seek discharge of
otherwise nondischargeable debts under chapter 13. Particularly
in view of the policy implications of loosely permitting a debtor
to discharge willful and malicious tort judgments, courts must
take a more restrictive approach to discharge than merely pro-
claiming these judgments presumptively dischargeable.
In the context of willful and malicious infliction of injury, courts
should recognize that relatively few people incur debts as a result
of their willful and malicious action. As the Report of the Com-
mission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United States noted, "Nearly
all studies of nonbusiness bankruptcies also ascribe causation
principally to mismanagement, ineptitude, and extravagance." 145
In short, most claims in consumer bankruptcy are contract based,
not tort based.148 Nonetheless, recognition of the relative number
of people affected by restricting malicious and willful debt dis-
144. See Rimgale, 669 F.2d at 427 n.2 (quoting S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
12, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5799) ("100 percent payment
plans will be encouraged by the limitation on availability of a [second, later] discharge in
section 727(aX8). This kind of plan has provided great self-satisfaction and pride to those
debtors who complete [it], and at the same time effect a maximum return to creditors.");
see also In re Reyes, 106 Bankr. 155, 160 (Bankr. NJ). Ill. 1989) (mem.) (Boulden, J.,
appendix from the bench) ("[T]he integrity and credibility of the system is dependent in
large upon Chapter 13 debtors consummating plans which repay the maximum amount
possible to creditors.").
145. REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON THE BANKRuPTcY LAWS OF THE U.S., H.R. Doc. No. 137,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 62 (1973).
146. See d. The Commission's Report stated: "'Why did the debtors go to bankruptcy
court? Those who were interviewed were first asked about underlying problems-why
they were in financial difficulty. The leading reason, given by 31 percent, was poor debt
management-too many debts, unwise [reifinancing, overspending."' Id. (quoting D. STAN-
LEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROBLEM, PROCESS, REFORM 47 (1971)). The Report continued:
"[S]tudies of nonbusiness bankruptcy do not report any incidence of dishonesty as a
primary cause of resort to relief under the Act." Id. at 64.
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charge is important in considering whether the uniqueness of
such debt merits a restricted standard for discharge. Because
relatively few people are affected by such a restriction, the
possibility increases that the hardship imposed upon the victim/
creditor outweighs the goal of encouraging debtors to file under
chapter 13.
Undeniably, forcing a debtor to live with a debt from which
he cannot escape would be inimical to a fresh start.147 Too often,
however, courts have allowed the fresh start doctrine, combined
with the desirability of having debtors file under chapter 13, to
overshadow consideration of the debtor's moral turpitude and its
corresponding impact on the debtor's good faith.148 Moreover,
because of the many incentives to file under chapter 13 in addition
to its liberal discharge provisions,' 49 placing restrictions on the
absolute ability to discharge willful and malicious tort judgments
should not significantly affect the desirability of filing under
chapter 13.
RESTRICTING ABSOLUTE DISCHARGE UNDER CHAPTER 13
No black letter rule can adequately address the extent to
which courts should allow debtors to discharge willful and mali-
cious tort judgments due to the breadth of the "willful and
malicious" category.' 5 Nevertheless, courts can establish some
articulable guiding principles for restricting tort judgment dis-
charges in chapter 13 by encompassing creditor classification
within the flexible good faith determination.
Defining "Willful and Malicious"
When devising a means of accounting for the debtor's egregious
action in chapter 13 discharge, courts must first recognize that
not all willful and malicious tort judgments are created equal.
The diversity of acts that courts have classified as willful and
malicious clearly demonstrates the divergent degrees of moral
culpability that attach to such acts and the need to distinguish
among them.
147. See Handeen v. LeMaire (Un re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd
en bane, 898 F.2d 1346 (1990).
148. See, e.g., Johnson v. Seely (In re Seely), 6 Bankr. 309, 310-13 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980)
(holding that the underlying circumstances giving rise to a debt, no matter how egregious,
cannot implicate the good faith of the debtor's filing).
149. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 151-59.
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The definition of "willful and malicious" has sparked much
debate among courts and commentators. 151 In In re Goldzweig,152
for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Illinois defined "willful and malicious" injury to mean "one which
is deliberately or intentionally inflicted."'5 Other courts, however,
have expanded the definition to include an intent to perform the
act and not necessarily to cause the specific harm.'5 In the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress somewhat
clarified the meaning of "willful and malicious" by emphasizing
that the category does not encompass negligence or reckless-
ness 155
Because Congress did not intend willful and malicious to mean
negligent or reckless, the debtor must reveal some intent to
inflict injury. Inferentially, a relatively high degree of moral
culpability thus attaches to willful and malicious acts within the
meaning of the statute. Presumably, Congress accounted for the
high level of moral culpability involved by exempting from chap-
ter 7 discharge debts incurred through willful and malicious
action. Nevertheless, a review of the case law illustrates the
expansive scope courts have given the willful and malicious
category.'5 For example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has classified malicious prosecution as willful
and malicious under chapter 7.157 The Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that a debtor's fraudulent
transfer of a leased truck amounted to willful and malicious
injury, rendering the debt nondischargeable. 15e Finally, in a most
151. See Note, In re Cecchini: Willful and Malicious Injury-Nondischargeability in
Bankruptcy, 17 PAc. L.J. 1511 (1986) (authored by Jeffrey H. Ochrach).
152. Winterland Concessions Co. v. Goldzweig (In re Goldzweig), 54 Bankr. 229 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd, 63 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (mem.).
153. Id. at 233.
164. See, e.g., Moraes v. Adams (rn re Adams), 761 F.2d 1422, 1425-27 (9th Cir. 1985).
155. When enacting the Bankruptcy Code, Congress expressly overruled the Supreme
Court in Tinker v. Colwell, 193 U.S. 473 (1904). In Tinker, the Court inferred willfulness
and maliciousness from the nature of the act. Id. at 481. In commenting on 11 U.S.C. 5
523(a)(6) excepting "willful and malicious injury by the debtor" from discharge under
chapter 7, Congress stated: "Under this paragraph 'willful' means deliberate or intentional.
To the extent that Tinker v. ColweU held that a less strict standard is intended, and to
the extent that other cases have relied on Tinker to apply a 'reckless disregard' standard,
they are overruled." S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADuNn. NEws 5787, 5865 (citation omitted).
156. See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text.
157. Hardin v. Caldwell (In re Caldwell), 897 F.2d 529 (6th Cir. 1990) (opinion published
at No. 88-5915 (Mar. 6, 1990)) (WESTLAW, Allfeds database).
158. Mileasing Co. v. Allavena (In re Allavena), 18 Bankr. 527 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
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obvious example, the Eighth Circuit held that the intentional
infliction of physical injury was willful and malicious.1 9 These
three examples demonstrate the diversity of acts classified as
willful and malicious and illustrate the variety of degrees of
moral culpability attached to each.
Establishing Good Faith: Creditor Classification
To prevent chapter 13 from becoming "a haven for criminal
debtors,"'60 courts must restrict a debtor's ability to discharge
willful and malicious tort judgments. Certainly, courts should
acknowledge that in many instances a large percentage of the
debtor's entire debt consists of the willful and malicious tort
judgment against him.16' As a result, such a debtor often reverts
to chapter 13 simply to escape, or at least to modify, the court-
imposed judgment against him. As some courts have noted, this
practice in itself indicates bad faith.162
The spectrum of willful and malicious actions places such
actions on a sliding scale of permissible dischargeability. As the
analysis in LeMaire provides, policy implications resulting from
a discharge of such debts must inform the court's determination
of the extent of permissible dischargeability. When the actions
are minimally egregious, the debtor legitimately can propose in
good faith to discharge the tort judgment to an extent equal to
other unsecured claims.163 More egregious circumstances, in turn,
may require the debtor to classify the victim's claim separately,
proposing a higher percentage payment.164 The most egregious
159. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989), rev'd en bane,
898 F.2d 1346 (1990).
160. Id. at 1375.
161. See Roszkowski, Good Faith and Chapter 18 Plans Providing for Debts Nondis-
chargeable Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Assure Rehabilitation,
Not Liquidation, 46 Bus. LAW. 68, 100-09 (1990), for a list of cases and a chart of the
percentage of total debt represented by nondischargeable chapter 7 claims. See, e.g., In
re Manes, 67 Bankr. 13 (Bankr. ED. Ark. 1986) (mem.) (willful and malicious tort judgment
represented 78.45 0 of debt); In re Keiser, 35 Bankr. 496 (Bankr. D. Del. 1983) (mem.)
(tort judgment represented 100% of debt); In re Fox, 23 Bankr. 464 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y.
1982) (mem.) (tort judgment amounted to 64.94% of total debt under the chapter 13
repayment plan).
162. See In re Castonguay, 119 Bankr. 256, 259 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990) (mem.); In re
Jacobs, 102 Bankr. 239, 242 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1988).
163. Minor property damage, for example, may fall within the minimally egregious
category of willful and malicious tort judgments.
164. See Note, supra note 135, at 389-96 (arguing for a separate classification in a
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actions, however, may prevent any reasonable debtor from pro-
posing in good faith to pay less than one hundred percent of the
court-ordered judgment arising from such action, thereby pre-
cluding the debtor from discharging the tort judgment under
chapter 13.165
The creditor classification provisions allow courts to account
for the varying degrees of moral culpability inherent in willful
and malicious acts. Specifically, courts should consider if and how
debtors classify their creditors in the determination of the debt-
or's good faith.
Classifying Creditors Pursuant to the Code
Section 1322(b)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code permits the debtor,
within his plan, to "designate a class or classes of unsecured
claims, as provided in section 1122. ' 166 Section 1122(a), in turn,
states that "a plan may place a claim or an interest in a particular
class only if such claim or interest is substantially similar to the
other claims or interests of such class."' 67 According to such
classifications, the debtor may provide differing percentage re-
payments to various classes, but expressly "may not discriminate
unfairly against any class so designated."'l
Courts have differed, however, in determining exactly what
constitutes unfair discrimination among classes of claims. As one
court stated, "The court must examine the amounts proposed for
each class in light of the debtor's reasons for classification, and
exercise sound discretion."' 69 In the most liberal view, some
courts have stated that no unfair discrimination exists as long
as the chapter 13 plan proposes to pay creditors more than they
would receive under chapter 7.170 Other courts have rejected such
a loose interpretation. As the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit stated in Barnes v. Wlelan,1'71
chapter 13 plan for creditors to whom the debtor must make criminal restitution payments
that are generally nondischargeable in chapter 7 but dischargeable in chapter 13). Possible
examples of more egregious acts may include infliction of serious property damage, such
as might result from arson, or moderately severe infliction of personal injury.
165. Examples of most egregious actions include the intentional infliction of serious,
debilitating, and potentially permanent personal injury, such as attempted murder or
permanent bodily disfigurement.
166. 11 U.S.C. S 1322(b)(1) (1988).
167. I& S 1122(a).
168. Id. S 1322(b)(1).
169. Barnes v. Whelan, 689 F.2d 193, 202 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
170. In re Sutherland, 3 Bankr. 420 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1980).
171. 689 F.2d 193.
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"Section 1322(b)(1) prohibits unfair discrimination; and an inquiry
into fairness plainly involves more than the rationality of the
debtor's classifications or some minimum amount creditors must
receive."172
At the other extreme, some courts have held that "only debts
which have identical legal rights in the debtor's . . . assets may
be classified together."' 73 The Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Utah held in In re Iacovoni 74 that all unsecured creditors thus
have an equal right to payment, and the only exception to such
a rule is administrative convenience, specified in section 1122(b). 7 5
Other courts, however, have faulted such a restrictive view,
arguing that "section 1322(b)(1) . . . specifically authorizes des-
ignation of more than one class of unsecured creditor, each
presumably with equal legal rights to the debtor's estate."' 176
Generally, the more balanced approach involves a case-by-case
determination of unfair discrimination.'77 Courts adopting this
approach have considered a number of factors, including: (1)
whether the discrimination has a reasonable basis; (2) whether
the classification is necessary to the debtor's rehabilitation under
chapter 13; (3) whether the discrimination is proposed in good
faith; and (4) whether the degree of differential treatment ac-
corded the class discriminated against is directly related to the
basis for the discrimination.' 8 This approach permits debtors to
classify creditors who claim nondischargeable chapter 7 debts
separately from other unsecured creditors. For example, the
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Georgia held in
In re Freshley'79 that a debtor may classify nondischargeable
chapter 7 debts in a separate class under a chapter 13 plan
because Congress itself has indicated a policy choice to distin-
guish such debts.80
172. Id. at 201.
173. In re Iacovoni, 2 Bankr. 256, 260 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980).
174. 2 Bankr. 256.
175. Id at 260.
176. Barnes, 689 F.2d at 201.
177. See In re Freshley, 69 Bankr. 96, 97 (Bankr. NJ). Ga. 1987) (holding that a case-
by-case determination of unfair discrimination provides courts with the flexibility to
determine what is equitable based on the particular facts of each case); Barnes, 689 F.2d
at 202 ("What constitutes fair discrimination will vary from case to case .... ").
178. Freshley, 69 Bankr. at 97; AMFAC Distrib. Corp. v. Wolff (In re Wolff), 22 Bankr.
510 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
179. 69 Bankr. 96.
180. Id. at 97-98.
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Creditor Classification: Accounting for the Debtor's Willful
and Malicious Tort
Two principal reasons justify forcing debtors/tortfeasors to
classify their victims' claims separately. First, forced creditor
classification would recognize that the nature of the debtor's
willful and malicious act demonstrates a degree of ill will towards
his victim. Consequently, forced classification would circumvent
likely debtor reluctance to voluntarily classify the victim's claims
separately to provide the victim with a higher percentage pay-
ment. Second, required creditor classification would account for
both the involuntary nature of the transaction and the artificial
nature of monetary compensation afforded to those tort victims
whose claims relate to willful and malicious infliction of physical
injury. Specifically, the victim of the willful and malicious tort is
an involuntary creditor, and thus, unlike most creditors, did not
assume any risk of debtor insolvency.
Despite the reasons advanced for required separate classifica-
tion for willful and malicious tort victims/creditors, courts may
hesitate to impose such a requirement. In particular, the Bank-
ruptcy Code couches the classification provision in permissive
language.' s' The discretionary nature of the good faith provision
and judicial interpretation of the impact of a plan's duration on
the good faith determination, however, justify the court's ability
to mandate creditor classification. Specifically, such a requirement
is analogous to a court requiring a repayment plan to span a
minimum duration. Similar to the permissive language of the
creditor classification provision, the Code fails to mandate a plan's
duration, except that the plan may last a maximum of three
years unless the court approves a duration lasting five years. 8 2
The permissive language of the duration provisions has not
prevented some courts from factoring a proposed duration into
their good faith determination.183 Likewise, the permissive lan-
181. 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(b1) (1988); see supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
182. 11 U.S.C. 5 1322(c).
183. See Handeen v. LeMaire (Un re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1375-76 (8th Cir. 1989)
(noting that the bankruptcy court denied confirmation of LeMaire's original plan which
spanned only three years, concluding LeMaire was not committing all his disposable
income to the plan, and "expressed concern about LeMaire's failure to propose a plan for
the maximum statutory period of sixty months"), rev'd en bane, 898 F.2d 1346 (1990);
Lawrence Tractor Co. v. Gregory (In re Gregory), 705 F.2d 1118, 1121-22 nA (9th Cir.
1983) (indicating that the debtor's plan was vulnerable to a good faith challenge due to
a proposed duration of "only six months . . . and no explanation was offered why he
could not continue the plan for an additional period and make some payment on his
unsecured debts").
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guage of the classification provision should not preclude a court
from using creditor classification as an indication of good faith.
Requiring the debtor to classify willful and malicious tort
victims' claims separately restricts the highly culpable tortfea-
sor's ability to manipulate chapter 13 to modify the civil judgment
imposed against him for his egregious act. In particular, the
debtor must commit all of his disposable income to the plan over
the plan's duration, 184 thus limiting the total funds available for
repayment to creditors. In other words, disposable income is
similar to a pie, with all unsecured creditors sharing with other
general creditors. The good faith requirement thus precludes the
debtor from discharging his tort judgment in chapter 13 to the
extent necessary to enable the debtor to pay sufficient funds to
his other unsecured creditors. He then must revert to chapter 7
to liquidate and distribute the proceeds of his assets to the other
unsecured creditors and continue paying on the willful and ma-
licious judgment rendered against him.8 5
For those willful and malicious tortfeasors/debtors who manage
to meet chapter 13's good faith requirement by proposing pay-
ment of an acceptable percentage of the victim's claim, the
percentage paid to each other unsecured creditor's claim will
diminish due to the debtor's need to pay the victim a higher
percentage of the claim. Nevertheless, the debtor's use of chapter
13 does not harm, and indeed may still benefit, creditors. Specif-
ically, these other unsecured creditors still will receive an equal
or greater percentage of their claim than they otherwise would
in a chapter 7 proceeding.'8
By classifying creditors and providing the victims of willful
and malicious tort judgments a higher percentage payment, there-
fore, everyone benefits. First, creditors receive payment of an
equal or higher percentage of their claim. Second, victims are
more highly compensated, taking into account the egregiousness
184. 11 U.S.C. 5 1325(b)(10B).
185. Indeed, 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(4) provides that each unsecured creditor must receive
at least as much from the chapter 13 plan as he would receive if the debtor were to
liquidate under chapter 7.
186. Specifically, 11 U.S.C. S 1325(a)(4) provides:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm a plan if-
(4) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be
distributed under the plan on account of each allowed unsecured claim
is not less than the amount that would be paid on such claim if the
estate of the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on
such date.
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of the action committed, the involuntary nature of the transaction
between the debtor and the victim, and, in the event of personal
injury, the artificial nature of -monetary compensation for the
actual harm suffered. Finally, by leaving open the possibility for
the debtor who meets the good faith requirement to discharge
all remaining debts at the end of the plan, the approach preserves
the fresh start for the debtor.
Determining the Dischargeable Percentage of a Willful and
Malicious Tort Claim
To determine the percentage of a willful and malicious tort
judgment that a debtor can propose to discharge in good faith,
courts must determine the actual harm, suffered by the creditor/
victim. Victims suffering mere property damage would be closely
aligned with creditors whose loss is measurable strictly in mon-
etary terms. These creditors/victims are distinguishable from
other general creditors only by the involuntary nature of the
transaction. A willful and malicious tort victim's claims for prop-
erty damage may thus merit an equal or slightly higher percent-
age payment to meet the threshold good faith standard.
When the harm suffered by the victim/creditor is personal
injury, however, the distinction between such creditor and other
unsecured creditors is more pronounced. Society generally rec-
ognizes personal injury to be more serious than property dam-
age.18 The victim's loss in terms of physical pain, anguish, and
conceivably permanent injury is immeasurable in monetary terms.
The law provides financial compensation because such compen-
sation is the only legally available means to redress the harm.18
This ancient societal distinction of valuing bodily integrity over
interests in property justifies extension into bankruptcy. Reason
dictates that unsecured creditors with claims from a court-
imposed judgment against willful and malicious wrongdoers who
have caused the creditor physical pain and suffering have a higher
moral claim to payment than one suffering a mere financial loss.
The distinction justifies classifying such willful and malicious
187. Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization
and Legislative Compensation Versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEx. L. REV. 1297,
1343 (1983) (authored by Margaret I. Lyle).
188. Id.
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debts separately from other unsecured claimants, providing a
higher percentage payment.
Although this approach may preclude a debtor from discharg-
ing his tort judgment in chapter 13, two justifications substan-
tiate rendering certain highly culpable willful and malicious tort
judgments nondischargeable. First, policy dictates that courts
must prevent chapter 13 from becoming a refuge for criminals
by allowing modification of court-ordered judgments for particu-
larly heinous crimes. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly,
courts have a moral obligation to the victims of such action, who
may suffer severe physical pain and emotional anguish, to ensure
that they receive just compensation. 19 Courts, within their dis-
cretion and with regard to the egregiousness of the debtor's
willful and malicious act, should not hesitate to conclude that the
debtor's proposed discharge of the civil judgment against him is
unconscionable, and thus in bad faith.
CONCLUSION
The adverse policy implications of permitting an attempted
murderer's discharge of a civil tort judgment arising from his
criminal act amply justify the Eighth Circuit's en banc decision
in LeMaire.'90 By grounding its opinion solely in policy consider-
ations and providing little analysis applicable outside the facts
of LeMaire, however, the Eighth Circuit's decision is of dubious
value to other courts confronted with willful and malicious tort-
feasor's attempts to discharge tort judgments in chapter 13.
The problem confronting the Eighth Circuit was the absence
of a clearly defined good faith provision in chapter 13. Accord-
ingly, other courts have adhered to a case-by-case analysis. The
good faith provision of chapter 13, in conjunction with the creditor
classification provision, however, permits courts to account for a
debtor's culpable conduct by restricting a debtor's ability to
discharge willful and malicious tort judgments.
189. As the dissent in the panel decision of LeMaire noted,
The court... is swayed by the bankruptcy court's concern with the debtor
having to live the rest of his life with a significant judgment that would be
inimical to a fresh start .... This leaves completely out of the equation
the fact that the intentionally injured creditor has to live the rest of his life
with the injuries inflicted and with the partial amount paid on the judgment
as his only balm.
Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 883 F.2d 1373, 1382 (8th Cir. 1989) (Gibson, J.,
dissenting), rev'd en bane, 898 F.2d 1346 (1990).
190. Handeen v. LeMaire (In re LeMaire), 898 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
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The breadth of acts classified as willful and malicious mandates
that courts not treat equivalently all tort judgments arising from
such actions. Rather, courts must analyze such tort judgments
along a sliding scale of dischargeability: the more egregious the
willful and' malicious act, the higher percentage of payment the
plan must propose to the victim to meet chapter 13's good faith
requirement. Forcing debtors to classify willful and malicious tort
claims separately recognizes the involuntary nature of the trans-
actions and the legal fiction of monetary compensation to tort
victims for pain and suffering. Moreover, such classifications and
the corresponding requirement for higher percentage payments
for egregious torts may altogether preclude the highly culpable
tortfeasor from discharging the tort judgment against him. Such
restrictions go a long way in preventing chapter 13 from becom-
ing a haven for criminals in violation of the purpose, spirit, and
policies of chapter 13.
Robert L. Miller
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